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Dual Process Theories: Objections, Evidence and Significance

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Lecture 08

Moral Psychology

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While lots of lectures are self-standing, today’s lecture builds on lecture 07. And in particular on the loose reconstruction of Greene’s argument.

continues Lecture 07

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Could scientific discoveries undermine, or support,
ethical principles?

Phase 2

Identify general arguments against the use of intuitions in doing ethics.

Consider implications for Rawl’s method of
reflective equilibrium.

Phase 1

Find places where a particular philosopher’s ethical argument relies on an empirical claim, and where knowledge of this claim depends on scientific discoveries.

Can be supportive rather than debunking. However, practically speaking, it’s easier to show that knowledge of the claim depends on scientific discoveries when the science contradicts the ethicist’s claim. (Otherwise it’s hard to show that the ethicist knew the claim was true all along.)

✓

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The essence of anti-intuition arguments is captured by Railton (who is offering considerations with which to counter them):

‘a better understanding of the [...] origin of “intuitive” moral judgments might show them to be something other than manifestations of underlying moral competencies or principles.

“moral intuitions” might therefore deserve less deference [...] than they characteristically receive in philosophical [...] moral thought’

(Railton, 2014, p. 832).

As Railton makes clear, there are several ways of developing this idea. We have been pursuing one such way.
The argument doesn't deny that intuitions manifest an underlying moral competence. Rather, the claim is that this competence, likely based on *fast* processes (see glossary), has limits, similar to our competencies for tracking physical objects or quantities. These *fast* processes trade accuracy for speed, making them reliable mainly in familiar, high-stakes situations, but not necessarily outside that range. So, the issue isn't the absence of competence, but the nature and limits of the competence derived from *fast* processes.
'less deference' is tricky. In one sense, philosophers might give intuitions *too little* deference by treating them as black boxes and ignoring questions about their origins and variability. In another sense, if these intuitions stem from processes reliable only in limited contexts, they deserve *less* deference as guides to truth in novel or unfamiliar situations, which are often the focus of ethical theorising.
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So?

One response to our argument has been to deny that philosophers ever rely on intuitions (Cappelen, 2012). But that is not a widely held view (and we can give deeper objections, but let’s not get side-tracked).
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‘Intuition is a resource in all of philosophy, but perhaps nowhere more than in ethics’ (Audi, 2015, p. 57).

‘Episodic intuitions [...] can serve as data [...] beliefs that derive from them receive prima facie justification’ (p. 65).

Always gotta ask what it means. Audi explains it in terms of self-evidence (if you understand it you know it).

‘intellectual seemings—a phenomenal, attentional sense of the truth of the proposition in question

... These seemings [...] are commonly taken to entail inclinations to believe’ (Audi, 2015, p. 61).

Audi considers different forms of intuition, but the key is episodic intuitions, which are seemings.
episodic intuitions are phenomenal, occurrent seemings of a proposition’s truth that arise non-inferentially, incline one toward belief, but are not themselves beliefs, and can serve as basic evidence
We understand why someone might think there were such things. But how could such things exist in the domain of ethics?
The only possibility I’m aware of is that they are a consequence of fast processes.
In familiar situations and concerning matters that are significant for reproductive success, fast process are super reliable. So if there are judgements the give rise to, it’s just conceivable that the corresponding propositions could be self-evidence in Audi’s sense.
Or maybe there just are not self-evident propositions in ethics.
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previously

1. Ethical judgements are explained by a dual-process theory ...

...

6. Not-justified-inferentially premises about particular moral scenarios cannot be used in ethical arguments where the aim is knowledge.

plan for today

Evidence for the dual-process theory

Evidence against the dual-process theory

Conclude more evidence is needed

Significance for reflective equilibrium (->09)