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Framing Effects: Emotion and Order of Presentation

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Thomson’s method

[premise] There is a morally relevant difference between David and Edward.

[premise] There is no morally relevant difference between Edward and Frank.

[premise] ...

[conclusion] Thomson’s principle better explains the moral facts than Foot’s principle.

(how) do I know?

Not by inference. The premise is noninferentially justified (if it is justified at all).

Can noninferentially justified judgements like this ground knowledge?

‘One's intuitions are, I think, fairly sharp on these matters’ (Thomson, 1976, p. 207).

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THESIS ‘no moral Intuitions are justified noninferentially’

(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 74)

i.e. reflective judgements for which there is no inferential justification.

ARGUMENT

‘Evidence of framing effects

makes it reasonable [...] to assign a large probability of error to moral intuitions in general

and then

to apply that probability to a particular moral intuition

until they have [...] reason to believe that the particular moral intuition [has] a smaller probability of error’

(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008b, p. 99).

[Another, complementary argument: Rini (2013)]

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Does the evidence of framing effects successfully undermine the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge?

insert-transcript#a823ab59-e67c-4ffe-92ac-c202f5b1107d-here
Participants judge whether the red umbrell is Near (‘Vicino’) or ‘Far’ (‘Lontano’).
The experimenters measure the Judgment’s transition threshold (JTT) for each subject (where they transition from near to far)
Findings: when there is a real, unconstrained person, the JTT is further away.
Interpretation: participants spontaneously adopt the other body as the reference point for categorizing extrapersonal space.

Fini, Brass, & Committeri (2015, p. figure 1)

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Does the evidence of framing effects successfully undermine the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge?

insert-transcript#a3c79d56-453c-486a-919c-57a2c425349f-here

Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015 figure 2 (part)

order effects. (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015, p. figure~2 (part))
insert-transcript#e7016319-5619-476c-bbb3-4ae61aa7deb9-here

order-of-presentation effects (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2015)

additional irrelevant options (Wiegmann, Horvath, & Meyer, 2020)

‘Asian disease’ (Prospect) framing (Wiegmann & Horvath, 2021)

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Does the evidence of framing effects successfully undermine the view that, as things stand, philosophers’ noninferentially justified moral judgements can yield knowledge?

Yes, there is evidence. But does the evidence do what it is supposed to do? Does it undermine?

Why are there order-of-presentation effects?

Because one scenario selectively highlights an aspect of the causal structure of another scenario?

Wiegmann & Waldmann (2014)

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ethical
judgements

spatial
judgements

financial
judgements

...

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In certain other cases

‘there is no underlying preference that is masked or distorted by the frame. Our preferences are about framed problems, and our moral intuitions are about descriptions, not about substance’

(Kahneman, 2013).

insert-transcript#3052e0cd-e6d2-4923-83db-ffdee766a013-here

‘expert ethicists have a genuine advantage over laypeople with respect to some well-known biases’

(Wiegmann & Horvath, 2021)

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[premise] There is a morally relevant difference between David and Edward.

[premise] There is no morally relevant difference between Edward and Frank.

None of the framing effects yet discovered explain why we make these particular patterns of judgement.

Therefore a noninferentially justified judgement can be knowledge (for all we know).

insert-transcript#4483a9d3-90fd-4786-8510-a67082163b00-here

THESIS ‘no moral Intuitions are justified noninferentially’

(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a, p. 74)

ARGUMENT

‘Evidence of framing effects

makes it reasonable [...] to assign a large probability of error to moral intuitions in general

and then

to apply that probability to a particular moral intuition

until they have [...] reason to believe that the particular moral intuition [has] a smaller probability of error’

(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008b, p. 99).

[Another, complementary argument: Rini (2013)]

no

insert-transcript#246f8bca-c897-4001-bbdb-c5634c48542b-here
This is still a live question (How, if at all, do I know that Thomson’s premises are true?)

Thomson’s method

[premise] There is a morally relevant difference between David and Edward.

[premise] There is no morally relevant difference between Edward and Frank.

[premise] ...

[conclusion] Thomson’s principle better explains the moral facts than Foot’s principle.

(how) do I know?

insert-transcript#071c72cd-88c2-4a2e-a3ab-305098776c86-here

a deeper understanding